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Deutsch
Eine der Hauptfragen, die den Neoplatonismus in der Spätantike des 3. bis 6. Jh. n. Chr.
dominiert, betrifft die Natur des ersten Prinzips, das ‘das Eine’ genannt wird. Seit Plotin
wurde das Prinzip als die Ursache aller Dinge charakterisiert, da es die Pluralität der
intelligiblen Formen hervorbringt, die die rationale und materielle Struktur der Welt
konstituieren. Ausgehend hiervon begegnen die Neuplatoniker einem Problem, das darin
liegt, dass das Eine, insofern es erste Ursache ist, alle Dinge transzendieren muss, die
durch Pluralität charakterisiert werden – und trotzdemmuss das Eine, weil es auch die
Ursache der Pluralität ist, die Pluralität in sich selbst antizipieren. Dies ist die Haupt-
motivation dafür, dass der Fokus dieser Untersuchung auf zwei späte Neuplatoniker
konzentriert, Proklos (5. Jh. n. Chr.) und Damaskios (spätes 5., frühes 6. Jh. n. Chr.):
beide versuchen dieses Problem in zwei recht verschiedenen Wegen anzugehen. Der
Lösungsversuch von Proklos beinhaltet die Setzung von zwischengeordneten Prinzipien
(den „Henaden“), die die Natur des Einen spiegeln, als ‘Einheiten’, aber direkt Ursache von
Pluralität sind. Dies bewirkt, dass das eine nur noch Ursache von Einheit ist, während
die Erzeugung der Pluralität durch die Henaden vermittelt wird, die es hervorbringt.
Damaskios glaubt, während er sich Proklos’ Theorie aneignet, dass dies nicht genug ist:
wenn das Eine als Ursache von allen Dingen gesetzt ist, muss es in direktemVerhältnis zur
Pluralität stehen, sogar dann, wenn seine Kausalität durch die Henaden vermittelt wird.
Daher spaltet Damaskios Proklos’ Eins in zwei Entitäten: (1) das Unsagbare als erstes
„Prinzip”, das absolut transzendent ist und in keinem kausalen Verhältnis steht und (2)
das Eine als die erste „Ursache” von allen Dingen, das aber im Vergleich zum Unsagbaren
nur relativ transzendent.
Frühere Studien, die Proklos undDamaskios vergleichen, tendieren dazu sich Entweder
auf das Unsagbare zu fokussieren oder auf den Skeptizimus in Damaskios, aber es gibt
kaum Untersuchungen, die sich mit den kausalen Rahmenkonzepten beschäftigen, die
den Positionen beider Denker zugrunde liegen. Daher schlägt die vorliegende Unter-
suchung vor, sich auf die kausalen Rahmenkonzepte der beiden Denker zu konzentrieren:
wie und warum versucht Proklos zu erklären, dass das Eine eine Ursache ist, während
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es gleichzeitig seineWirkung transzendiert? Was bringt Damaskios dazu, einen Kaus-
alitätsbegriff für das Eine vorzuschlagen, der es in gewissem Sinn der Transzendenz in
dem Sinn beraubt, in dem ein höheres Prinzip, wie das Unsagbare, transzendent ist?
Die vorliegende Arbeit wird diese Fragen in zwei Schritten beantworten. Im ersten wer-
den die Kausalitätsbegriffe von Proklos und Damaskios untersucht, soweit sie auf alle
Bereiche des Seins angewendet werden. Im zweiten Schritt wird die Kausalität des Einen
entsprechend beider Denker untersucht: für Proklos wird die Kausalität des Einen in ihm
selbst und die Kausalität der zwischengeordneten Prinzipien betrachtet; für Damaskios,
die Kausalität des einen und in welcher Weise das Unsagbare gebraucht wird, um das
Eine zu erklären. Das Ergebnis dieser Untersuchung wird zeigen, dass Proklos’ Theorie in
einer inneren Spannung resultiert auf die Damaskios mit seiner Interpretation des Einen
reagiert. Obwohl Damaskios’ Lösungsversuch selbst einige Spannungen beinhaltet, löst
er zumindest ein Problem.
English
One of the main issues that dominates Neoplatonism in late antique philosophy of the
3rd–6th centuries A.D. is the nature of the first principle, called the ‘One’. From Plotinus
onward, the principle is characterized as the cause of all things, since it produces the
plurality of intelligible Forms, which in turn constitute the world’s rational and material
structure. Given this, the tension that faces Neoplatonists is that the One, as the first
cause, must transcend all things that are characterized by plurality—yet because it causes
plurality, the One must anticipate plurality within itself. This becomes the main mo-
tivation for this study’s focus on two late Neoplatonists, Proclus (5th cent. A.D.) and
Damascius (late 5th–early 6th cent. A.D.): both attempt to address this tension in two
rather different ways. Proclus’ attempted solution is to posit intermediate principles (the
‘henads’) that mirror the One’s nature, as ‘one’, but directly cause plurality. This makes the
One only a cause of unity, while its production of plurality is mediated by the henads that
it produces. Damascius, while appropriating Proclus’ framework, thinks that this is not
enough: if the One is posed as a cause of all things, it must be directly related to plurality,
even if its causality is mediated through the henads. Damascius then splits Proclus’ One
into two entities: (1) the Ineffable as the first ‘principle’, which is absolutely transcendent
and has no causal relation; and (2) the One as the first ‘cause’ of all things, which is only
relatively transcendent under the Ineffable.
Previous studies that compare Proclus and Damascius tend to focus either on the
Ineffable or a skeptical shift in epistemology, but little work has been done on the causal
framework which underlies both figures’ positions. Thus, this study proposes to focus
on the causal frameworks behind each figure: why and how does Proclus propose to
assert that the One is a cause, at the same time that it transcends its final effect? And
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what leads Damascius to propose a notion of the One’s causality that no longer makes it
transcendent in the way that a higher principle, like the Ineffable, is? The present work
will answer these questions in two parts. In the first, Proclus’ and Damascius’ notions of
causality will be examined, insofar as they apply to all levels of being. In the second part,
the One’s causality will be examined for both figures: for Proclus, the One’s causality in
itself and the causality of its intermediate principles; for Damascius, the One’s causality,
and how the Ineffable is needed to explain the One. The outcome of this study will show
that Proclus’ framework results in an inner tension that Damascius is responding to with
his notion of the One. While Damascius’ own solution implies its own tension, he at least
solves a difficulty in Proclus—and in so doing, partially returns to a notion of the One
much like Iamblichus’ and Plotinus’ One.

Acknowledgements
This list will always be incomplete for the many people who have helped me in this long,
arduous process,1 but first and foremost I wish to thank my Doktorvater, Peter Adamson,
for his immense help in steering the project and in clarifying the structure and flow of my
arguments and analysis of an otherwise-complex, dense series of texts. I have benefited
greatly from his methodology and approach, both in how to read texts, in doing a proper
study of history of philosophy, and in honing in on the basic questions that guide studies
such as this. I wish to thank my secondary supervisor, Jan Opsomer, for his generous help
and feedback in both the translations and general argument of my chapter on the One
in Damascius and Damascius’ response to Proclus2 during my visit to Leuven, back in
March, 2017. Opsomer’s wide background in Middle- and Neoplatonism has been very
useful in my studies, both from his papers and in dialogue with him. I also wish to thank
Sergei Mariev for his gracious willingness to be a reader and provide feedback for this
dissertation, as one of the only other professors at the LMUMunich (to my knowledge,
beyond Peter) who works on Neoplatonism-related topics—in his case in Byzantine
studies.
I wish to thank the Munich School of Ancient Philosophy for supporting my research
over the last three years, and especially the program community, both for their help and
support: in particular Christof Rapp, for his feedback and help to clarify my arguments
during my presentations in the doctoral colloquium; Laura Castelli, for her generosity
(and especially patience) in giving feedback for various chapter drafts; Fedor Benevich,
Bethany Somma, Antonio Ferro, and Máté Herner for their critiques and feedback in my
presentations and in discussing different aspects of my work; Andi Lammer, especially
for his generosity in allowing me to use his dissertation LaTeX template for this work; and
Niels Tolkiehn, both for his feedback in presentation and discussion, and especially help
in translating the Abstract.
Thanks especially goes to my previous MSc supervisor, Inna Kupreeva, for her help in
1 Especially for my friends (who may hopefully understand), for the short version of this I refer you to the
Acknowledgements page in Pietsch, B. M. (2015), Dispensational Modernism, (Oxford: Oxford University
Press).
2 Ultimately the first half of Chapter 5, below.
xi
xii Acknowledgements
guiding me on my current path in my last master’s thesis on Plotinus and Proclus. Her
vast knowledge of the texts and relevant secondary literature on any topic or question
proved quite useful, as well as her feedback on different presentations and discussions of
this doctoral study. I am also indebted to the community in Edinburgh for their help and
feedback on earlier presentations and work on this topic and the forerunner of this topic
frommymaster’s thesis.
I also wish to thank the community in Leuven duringmy visit inMarch, 2017, especially
Pieter d’Hoine, Carlos Steel, Albert Kobec, and Irini Fotini Viltanioti for their critical
feedback when I presented my work. In other presentations and conversation, I wish
to thank for their critical feedback and generous help Christoph Horn; Denis Walter;
Christoph Helmig; Stephen Menn; Antonio Vargas; George Boys-Stones; Philip Horky;
Marije Martijn; Evan King; David Butorac; Daniel Watson; Alan Brown; and Gonzalo
Gamarra Jordan. I have been very fortunate to have had the time to discuss the issues in
my study with these people, for which I’m grateful.
As I briefly reference in my Preface, I wish to thank the tutors and community from
my undergraduate institution, Thomas Aquinas College—both then and even now—for
giving me the foundation for my subsequent research in the master’s and PhD, especially
with the broad coverage of texts that we studied and the emphasis on close readings of
primary texts. This specific approach has guided me ever since, for which I will always be
grateful.
Last but not least in this long list, I wish to thank the generous, personal support of my
close friends and family, spread between my times spent in Germany, Scotland, and all
over the US. My stability and inner wellbeing has greatly depended on these people, for
which I will always be in their debt.
Preface
The inspiration for this study is in large part thanks to a confluence of personal influences:
in particular, both my unusual, yet beneficial liberal arts education—which heavily
focused on Thomas Aquinas and the main works of Aristotle—and, at about the same
time, my introduction to Byzantine Church Fathers, especially Gregory Palamas. I came
to find that both Aquinas and Palamas shared a common heritage, not just theologically
but especially in their philosophical terminology and framework, ultimately going back
to Aristotle and Plato, while their metaphysical positions implied a disagreement: for
instance, on the nature of God’s simplicity and causality, one figure (Aquinas) affirmed
the unity of God and denied any essential distinction in internal attributes or characters,
while the other (Palamas) appeared to affirm the opposite, by distinguishing between
the divine ousia and energeiai in God. What led these two figures to have such different
positions, given their shared philosophical background,1 initially puzzled me, and it
eventually ledme to consider the intervening period of late antique philosophy—starting
with Plotinus, and eventually the Aristotelian commentators and later Neoplatonists.
Since I pursued these areas in my postgraduate education, I have come to find that the
issues that recur in the later Latin and Byzantine figures can be traced back to the inner
disagreements among pagan Neoplatonists, as well as the way Aristotle and Plato were
read in late antiquity. In this regard, my work in late antiquity, especially in Neoplatonists
like Proclus and Damascius, has proved very beneficial and illuminating, both for my
earlier interests in Aquinas and Palamas, as well as the issues that are raised in themselves
by these late antique figures. In this regard I am a firm believer in past context informing
the philosophical debates and dialogues between figures,2 and that is especially the case
for the figures which are the focus of this study.
1 Excepting, of course, the immediate Byzantine Greek and Latin backgrounds. That is—inasmuch as they
possessed the texts from Aristotle, and Neoplatonists, as I go to show in the Introduction.
2 In this regard I generally follow, albeit with certain reservations, Skinner (1969)‘s argument for a middle
ground between a perennialist-only and a historical-contextualist-only reading of texts. I also follow Peter
Adamson’s ’rules’ for doing history of philosophy, which he has documented in a series of blog posts attached
to his podcast, ‘History of Philosophy without Any Gaps’. The question of methodology in how to read or
approach texts in history of philosophy, while also giving a critical philosophical judgment, is still an area
that merits further discussion and work.
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Given this background, this work is ultimately focused on the arguments made by
Proclus and Damascius, while it also attempts to engage the context from the Platonic
and Aristotelian backgrounds, as well as intermediate figures like the Stoics and earlier
Platonists. Here I wish to make a few quick notes on the technical guidelines for this
study.
Throughout this study, in block-quotations I provide the English translation first fol-
lowed by the Greek. All translations are mine, unless otherwise noted in the citation after
the translation. In my translations I give a close reading of the Greek wherever possible,
while taking into either the technical nature of certain passages or certain lines that
require some careful paraphrasing (as is the case, for instance, in Plotinus, sometimes
Damascius).3 Because I attempt a literal reading where possible, the English may appear
less pleasant and somewhat awkward, however this is with the hope of a thorough exam-
ination of the thought and text of each figure. In the main body of my work, whenever
I quote a word or phrase, I give a transliteration of the Greek for non-Greek readers’
convenience, unless there are specific features of the Greek on which I wish to comment.
I generally refer to secondary source discussions in the footnotes, except on specific
issues—for instance, the nature of the Limit and Unlimited in Proclus.4 I otherwise orient
the main discussions around the primary texts and the issues that arise. I provide an
outline of the main positions in the secondary literature connected to my topic in the
Status Quaestionis of the Introduction.5
Throughout the study I will follow general convention for Platonic and Neoplatonic
scholars by referring to principles and transcendent (Platonic) forms in the uppercase—
thus, ‘Form’ or ‘Intellect’, for the transcendent version; ‘form’ or ‘soul’, either for the
particular, immanent form (i.e. the form, ‘man’, in Socrates), or the particularized principle
or entity. There may be certain variations in some places, such as in the translations, but
I attempt to follow this general convention throughout.
All original Greek quotations and citations can be found under ‘Primary Sources’ in the
Bibliography. I also attempt to follow the recent critical editions for the Greek cited: for
instance, for Proclus’ Parmenides’ Commentary I follow Carlos Steel’s 2006–2009 edition
in the OCT series, unless otherwise noted in the citation.6
In giving the Greek, I also follow the standard conventional textual marks given by the
critical editions: thus,
• […]—forEnglish (translations andquotes)—indicates either paraphrasing, skipped
section, context provided.
3 Usually in these cases I defer to already-existing standard translations—for instanceArmstrong, for Plotinus,
orWesterink-Combès for Damascius.
4 In Ch. 4.5, p. 226 ff.
5 P. 13 ff.
6 This applies in at least two cases—strictly to refer to the line numbers. In these cases I indicate the citation
with ‘[Cousin]’.
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• […]—for Greek—indicates a deletion or ignoring in the edition.
• <…> indicates conjectural additions in the Greek, usually following the edition.
• (…) indicates transliterated Greek terms/phrases.
• Numbers in primary source quotations, especially in italic or bold, are mine unless
noted.
• In certain places I will sometimes italicize certain terms or phrases in a quote—this
is usually mine unless noted.
For abbreviations in footnotes or the text, one may locate their reference in the full
title under ‘Primary Sources’ in the Bibliography. Certain abbreviations, especially those
used in the footnotes, should be noted:
• ET = Proclus, Elementatio Theologica, Elements of Theology
• DP = Damascius’ De Principiis = On Problems and Solutions on First Principles
• PT = Proclus, Platonica Theologica = Platonic Theology
• GC = Aristotle, De Generatione et Corruptione = On Generation and Corruption
• DA = Aristotle, De Anima = On the Soul
• In Met. = In Aristotelis metaphysica commentaria = Syrianus’ or Alexander’s Com-
mentary on Aristotle’s Metaphysics (where noted)
• In Phys. = Simplicius, In Aristotelis Physicorum = On Aristotle’s Physics
• In Tim. = In Platonis Timaeum commentaria = Proclus’ or Iamblichus’ Commentary
on Plato’s Timaeus (where noted)
• In Phd. = Damascius, In Phaedonem = Commentary on the Phaedo
• In Parm. = In Platonis Parmenidem commentaria = Proclus’, Damascius’, or the
Anonymous’ Commentary on Plato’s Parmenides (where noted)
• In Eucl. = Proclus, In primum Euclidis Elementorum librum commentarii = Com-
mentary on the First Book of Euclid’s Elements
• In Alc. = Proclus, In Platonis Alcibiadem = Commentary on Alcibiades I
• In Phil. = Damascius, In Philebum = Lectures on the Philebus
• De comm. math. = Iamblichus, De communi mathematica scientia liber
• De Decem Dub. = Proclus, De decem quaestiones circa providentiam (under the Tria
Opuscula in the Bibliography) = Ten Problems Concerning Providence
• De Prov. = Proclus, De Providentia = On Providence

Introduction
The aimof this doctoral dissertation is an investigation into the nature of the first principle
and its causality between the two late Neoplatonists, Proclus and Damascius, of the fifth
to sixth centuries A.D. The issue is one that reflects basic philosophical interest, both
for the problems that are raised and discussed, as well as the place that the two figures
occupy in the history of philosophy. At stake for both philosophers is the question how
there can be a first cause of all things that, as the first principle (archê), comes before all
things, while as a cause, also implies synonymy with all things. The roots to this issue
stretch back to Plato and Aristotle with the Old Academy’s reception of the two, and
its relevance can be seen after the end of pagan Platonism in the sixth century, A.D.,
with questions that arise on the nature of God’s causality and transcendence in Arabic,
Byzantine, and Latin thought. The issue also reflects a basic, perennial issue about the
nature of causality: on the one hand, causality entails that the cause must pre-contain
or reflect the essential feature of the effect it produces—if one subscribes to a view
that essential features in things come to be in virtue of the cause’s own nature. On the
other hand, there are cases of causes that should not imply this synonymy—for instance,
the artisan’s idea or thought, which is immaterial, is not like the artifact that he or she
produces, which exists in matter. For Plato and Platonists this is, of course, one of the
main problems about the Forms’ causality, while it becomes one of the main issues for
divine causality in later figures in the history of philosophy. For these reasons, the focus of
this study will be on how both Proclus and Damascius respond to the difficulties involved
in the first principle’s causality within late Neoplatonism. In particular, the focus will be
how, and why, Proclus combines transcendence and causality for the Neoplatonic first
principle—the One—while Damascius separates these two functions into two, separate
principles: the Ineffable, as the purely transcendent first principle, and the One, as the
first true cause of all things.
Proclus (ca. 412–485 A.D.) and Damascius (ca. 462–after 532 A.D.) come towards
the end of a nearly-800 year run for the Platonic tradition, which culminates in the
period that has been termed ‘Neoplatonism’, from Plotinus (ca. 204/205–270 A.D.) to
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Olympiodorus (roughly 505–565 A.D.)1 and Simplicius (roughly 480–560 A.D.).2 Among
the previous eras of Platonism, the period marked by Neoplatonists is marked by an
extensive systematization that, in large part, goes back to Plotinus, while Proclus and his
successors, including Damascius, tighten this systematization on a number of standard
Platonist positions. The majority of Platonists in the tradition up to Proclus maintained a
traditional stance, going back to Plato’s middle dialogues and unwritten doctrines, about
the existence of transcendent Forms. On this understanding, the physical world has its
rational structure grounded in the Forms as transcendent, intelligible principles which
are separate from their particular instantiations—as, for instance, the Form of ‘tree’ or
‘treeness’ is distinct from different particular trees, yet provides each tree’s intelligible
structure and organization. For Neoplatonists from Plotinus onward, the derivation of
the world’s rational structure from the Forms necessitates distinguishing between three
immaterial principles: Soul,3 Intellect, and the One.4
Although one finds variations of this three-fold structure in previous Platonists before
Plotinus,5 what especially distinguishes Neoplatonists from Plotinus onward is that the
One for them is ‘beyond being’ in an absolute sense. This follows from Plato’s claim
about the Form of the Good in Republic VI in the sense that the category of ‘being’ (to
on) does not apply to the One as the cause of Being-itself. As ‘One’, this interpretation
is also combined with an ontological reading of the Parmenides’ first hypothesis, where
negations of the different attributes of being apply for the Form of the One. This results
in a unique kind of causality for the One, compared to the Forms: while each Form is a
cause through being of that specific kind, the One acts as a cause by not being identifiable
with one specific kind of being or another. This is rather distinct from, for instance, later
interpretations of the first cause in earlymedieval Arabic and Latin thought, as in the Liber
1 See Opsomer (2010) 697 about the speculation for the dates.
2 See Baltussen (2010) 711 about the speculation for the dates. One can argue that ‘Platonism’, generically
construed outside the Academy, continued beyond these figures—for instance in the form of the Christian,
John Philoponus (ca. 490–ca. 570 A.D.), and onward for Byzantines like Maximus the Confessor. Strictly
speaking, the school allegiance to Plato comes to an end in Athens with the closing of the Academy under
Justinian, in 529 A.D., and in Alexandria with Olympiodorus (roughly 500–570).
3 Here and throughout the dissertation, I will use uppercase for names, like ‘Soul’ or ‘Being’, indicating
self-subsisting principles or hypostases, while the lowercase for, e.g., ‘soul’ or ‘being’, to indicate either a
common ontological category or particular entity (as individual souls, like individual bodies).
4 To elaborate, (1) Soul distributes the world’s rational structure in matter and through time, using the Forms
as paradigms for generating that structure; (2) Intellect, which is separate frommatter (and by proxy Soul),
and contains and thinks the Forms in themselves; and, (3) the One, as the cause of the Forms’ unity, and
derivatively the cause of all things. In late Neoplatonists, from Iamblichus onward, this basic three-fold
structure becomes elaborated, when each principle becomes distinguished between one universal cause
andmultiple particular, participated principles—for instance, one universal cause, Soul-itself, and separate,
particular souls which correspond to their respective bodies. For an excellent diagram of this structure, see
Chlup (2012) 103.
5 Some of which will be broached in Ch. 1 (p. 23 ff.).
3de Causis, Avicenna, or Aquinas, where the principle, God, causes being and existence by
being paradigmatically existence-itself, without belonging to a particular genus or kind
of being.6 Thus in the Neoplatonic formulation of the One, one finds the confluence of
both transcendence—insofar as the One ‘is not’, in one sense, yet it is also a cause, which
implies some form of relation with the things it causes. It is here that one also meets
with an implicit tension, and where Proclus and Damascius become directly relevant
inasmuch as they address this tension that exists in earlier Platonists and Neoplatonists.
General Background on Causality and the
Platonic/Aristotelian Notion of 'Cause '
However before we go on, it is worth first reflecting on the basic question of causality.
Although causation in a contemporary context tends to be equated with event causation,7
for Platonists and Aristotelians causation is to be understood in terms of types, or kinds,
of causes that explain a given effect.8 Thus, when one asks why, for instance, the mug
fell, the answer given is not just that the hand pushed the mug—an event—but, more
primarily, that the hand is of a type (as having a hard surface, let’s say, or being moved)
such that it has the power to make the mug fall.9 In this sense, causality for these figures
is related to explaining essential features about natural substances and the world.10
AlthoughAristotelians and Platonists differ onwhere to place the causes of these essential
features—either solely in particular instantiations of a species (for Aristotelians), or
in transcendent Forms and causes (for Platonists)—they share the same position that
accounting for causes is directly related to ontology. Thus one important aspect for
both conceptions is the principle of causal synonymy: namely that a feature of the
cause, whether an essential or accidental property, is the same in kind as that which is
6 Thus only in a loose sense is the Neoplatonic One analogous to Avicenna and Aquinas’ God, insofar as
the first principle/God is a cause of beings by not being tied to the Forms or kinds of being—although
(and here the analogy breaks) unity is still considered a quasi-form of being, unlike the notion of existence
which does not directly imply ‘to be’ of a specific kind. Here I follow Adamson and Galluzzo (Forthcoming),
pace those like Gerson (1994): one does not find a metaphysical essence/existence distinction in Plotinus
(let alone Aristotle), but rather later with Avicenna.
7 This has been characterized as a ‘Neo-Humean’ approach (see e.g. Schmaltz (2014) 14–16). On event
causation in general, see Loux (2006) 187–204.
8 For a history of the notion of causation, specifically efficient causation, from antiquity to contemporary
philosophical discussions, see the overview of Schmaltz (2014).
9 In contemporary discussions of causation this position is represented as ‘causal dispositionalism’: see for
instance Mumford (2014).
10 Although Aristotle, for instance, allows for accidental causes: see Aristotle, Physics II.4–5. However even in
these cases, accidental causation is possible only within the context of admitting essential causes.
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transmitted in the effect.11 Thus the property, ‘heat’, in a hot stonewhich is dropped in cold
water is transmitted to the water: the water then also becomes the same in kind as the
cause, which is warm. This might initially seem counterintuitive for cases like a hammer
causing the effect of shattering glass: we would not say that the hammer, also, shatters,
even though it causes shattering. Synonymy would work in a different way in this case:
the hammer’s hard surface has the potentiality to produce shattering, while its material
makes it impossible for it in itself to shatter when the glass also shatters (rather unlike two
glasses, for instance, smashing into each other which may both shatter). The same form
is then shared between the two objects—for instance, we might say motion—while it
only exists in actuality in one, namely the glass, where the glass shards are put in motion.
Given these two examples, here we may mention two corresponding versions of this
principle: for Plato and later Platonists, the Forms are causally ‘synonymous’ with their
effects only in one direction—e.g. the Form of ‘Beauty’ conveys its essential property to
all beautiful things, while in itself it does not undergo the plurality of the participants
of ‘beauty’; for Aristotle, causes like the hot stone (above) are causally ‘synonymous’
with their effects in two directions—e.g. only an enmattered man produces another
enmattered man. In the former case, synonymy is held alongside the cause’s transcend-
ence in relation to the effect, similar to the example of the hammer and the glass. In the
case of man causing man, synonymy entails a two-way relation, which does not imply
transcendence, like the earlier example of the hot stone and water—in fact, typical cases
of synonymy for Aristotle entail reciprocity, so that the cold water, in turn, cools the
hot stone.12 Thus causes like the unmoved mover, for Aristotle, do not exhibit causal
synonymy, since they do not convey their characteristic property to the effect, as in the
case of the hot stone or the hammer; in the case of the unmoved mover, its actuality
as a divine intellect is entirely self-focused, and instead becomes the final cause for the
motion of the world-sphere, which in turn moves the stars and the planets.13
As we will later see,14 Neoplatonists like Proclus come to appropriate features from
both versions of causal synonymy: they appropriate Aristotle’s characterization that
11 The terminology, ‘synonymy’, comes from Aristotle: see e.g. Physics VIII.5, 257b9–14. On the principle
in general, see Bodnár and Pellegrin (2009) 279–289; Hankinson (1998) 31–32, 129; and Makin (1990).
Hankinson links the principle to Neoplatonists, in connection with the ‘principle of prior actuality’ and the
‘principle of simplicity’ in p. 454. The principle is further discussed below in Plato, Aristotle, and Proclus in
Ch. 2 (p. 91 ff.).
12 Thus in the hammer/glass case, above, even if the hammer does not shatter, it would still be, in some sense,
reciprocally acted on by the glass insofar as it is pushed back (whether slowed down or stopped). Implicitly
this is the case for causes that are in matter, like their effects. As we will see, Aristotle allows for cases of
efficient causes that do not imply reciprocal action: for instance, for the artist creating a statue, the artist’s
thought of the form of the statue is the efficient cause of the statue coming about, but it is not affected by
the matter of the statue that comes to be. Discussed below in Ch. 2.1.2, p. 103 ff.
13 Bodnár and Pellegrin (2009) 289–290.
14 Ch. 2.1, p. 94 ff.
5the actuality of the cause is that by which the effect is conveyed, yet they ultimately
keep a Platonist model that Forms and immaterial entities like Intellect and Soul are not
the same in kind, or reciprocally acted on, by the lower effect they produce. However
it is within the appropriation of this understanding of causal synonymy that we find
disagreements arising—specifically for Proclus in response to Plotinus and his successors,
and in turn for Damascius in response to Proclus. This issue becomes elaborated below,
but we may put it briefly here. Both figures appropriate a form of the Aristotelian model
of synonymy on their understanding of higher, immaterial causes in relation to the effects,
although in radically different ways. For Proclus, the cause is synonymous with its effect
‘by causality’ (kat’ aitian), since it anticipates the character of its effect and must, in some
way, pre-contain it. In Proclus’ model this means that one must add an additional ‘step’
and posit two kinds of causes: a first cause that does not imply such an anticipation kat’
aitian, and a second, intermediate cause where the kat’ aitian relation to the effect applies.
For Damascius, however, this is not enough: any notion of ‘cause’, in one or the other case,
directly entails its effect, and must reciprocally become like the effect it brings about. In
this sense Damascius more strongly holds to the Aristotelian model of causal synonymy.
However for immaterial causes, like Intellect and especially the One, this endangers their
transcendence and brings to the fore the issue of transcendence and causality when we
look at Proclus’ account in comparison with Damascius’.
Why Proclus and Damascius?
Given the general issue of causes, we may now ask, among other Neoplatonists, why
Proclus andDamascius are specifically considered in this study. Twoanswersmaybe given:
first, both philosophers explicitly respond to internal tensions in earlier Neoplatonists’
theories about the One, and further Damascius’ framework shows how a different kind
of tension results in Proclus’ own response to earlier Neoplatonists. And second, little
work has been done in contemporary scholarship on the relation between Proclus and
Damascius, specifically in light of responding to this internal tension between the One’s
causality and transcendence.
First for the historical background, one problem with the notion of the One, from
Plotinus onward, is that it at once transcends its effects, while as a cause it accounts
for specific features found in the effects—namely, the character of unity found in all
things, as well as the plurality which characterizes all things.15 Since plurality and unity
are entailed in ‘all things’, this suggests that the One is implicated with its effects, insofar
15 Whereas in earlier Platonists—for instance in the Old Academy—a second, apparently separate principle
accounted for the existence of matter and plurality, with the Old Academy’s Dyad for Speusippus and
Xenocrates. The trend for Neoplatonists, from Plotinus onward, is to affirm a strict one-principle view: the
One must then be responsible both for plurality and unity emerging from itself. See Plotinus, Enn. II.9.4.
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as causes are synonymous with their effects. Yet on Plotinus’ interpretation, and for all
subsequent Neoplatonists, the One radically transcends its effects in such a way that
it does not pre-contain the effect: for if the effect of the One is plurality, then the One
cannot, itself, be the plurality which it produces. In this sense the One is not a ‘cause’,
like other causes, since it is not synonymous with its effect of plurality. Yet, on the other
hand, it is still a ‘cause’ insofar as all things are from it, and insofar as it produces its own
property, unity, in all things. The difficulty then becomes how to distinguish between
these two aspects in the One: between its transcendence over plurality, and its synonymy
as the cause of unity in all things.
I address the varying attempts to solve this difficulty in Chapter 1, on the predecessors
of Proclus, but we may summarize at least two approaches that Cristina D’Ancona has
insightfully highlighted.16 The first approach, which is taken up by Plotinus and Porphyry
(and, as I argue, up to Iamblichus),17 is to say that the One’s causality is directly analogous
to the Forms’ causality: just as a given Form, like the ‘Beautiful-itself ’, gives shape to its
determined participants by being shapeless and undetermined relative to them, so the
One gives determination and thereby plurality to things by itself being formless and
without plurality compared to the Forms and all subsequent plurality. In this sense the
One functions like an intelligible cause.18 Yet the drawback of this approach is that it
suggests that the One is, in some sense, intelligible, exactly since the One acts like an
intelligible cause. Thus just as the Form, Beauty, anticipates the varying instantiations of
its propertywithin its unity, so also theOne anticipates the character of Intellect within its
unity. This would then make sense of why Plotinus often switches from radically negative
language to positive language for the One in treatises like Enn. VI.8.13 ff., where the One
is portrayed as the paradigm of Intellect inasmuch as it is a cause of itself and has its own
activity (energeia)—characters otherwise only appropriate for Intellect.19 We might then
characterize this as a sort of ‘two-sided’ approach for the One.
The second approach, which is taken up by Proclus and Damascius is to distinguish the
One from a set of intermediate principles, so that the One is only directly responsible for
the production of unity, while the intermediate principles are directly responsible for the
16 D’Ancona Costa (1996), esp. 361–362.
17 Unfortunately D’Ancona implicitly includes Iamblichus in what I call here the ‘second approach’ (i.e. separ-
ating the One’s causality from its production of plurality). As I show in Ch. 1.4 (p. 70 ff.), Iamblichus still
falls into the ‘first approach’, since he construes the One as the cause of plurality which is first manifested
in the intermediate principles after it. The difference in Proclus’ version is that the principles after the One
are themselves ‘one’-only, whereas for Iamblichus they are ‘one’ and plural at once. Cf. Damascius’ critique
of Iamblichus on this in DP II, 16,4–16 (and discussion below in p. 289 ff.).
18 D’Ancona Costa (1996) 374–375.
19 Of course it must be noted that Plotinus, himself, signposts his discussion beforehand in Enn. VI.8.13 as
unusual: he says that the positive attributes he gives for the One cannot be made in a literal, ‘correct’ way,
but in a second, ‘persuasive’ way, e.g. in lines 1–5. Discussed below in Ch. 1.2.1 (p. 52 ff.).
7production of plurality and unity at all lower levels of being.20 In one sense this relieves
the tension implied by the earlier model, since the One’s first effect is not plurality but
entities that are also just ‘one’ themselves (i.e. with the henads). At the same time the
One is still preserved as a cause of ‘all things’ through its delegated causality, while it also
transcends the plurality implied in all things, at the lower levels.
It is within this second approach that Proclus and Damascius diverge on the One’s
causal relation. As I show in the following chapters, Proclus and Damascius are both
responding to the tension implied in this first approach, however the solution that each
employs differs: for Proclus, theOne’s transcendence is also causal, insofar as the products
after the One are also ‘one’ in themselves. For Damascius, even while admitting inter-
mediate principles, the One still implies causal synonymy with ‘all things’; the One then
cannot be truly transcendent over ‘all things’. The difference between these two state-
ments hinges on how one understands the following causal sequence: if A causes B, and
B causes C, A is then a ‘cause’ of C. For Proclus, the conclusion does not imply that A is
synonymouswith C, although A is still a cause for C by transitivity. For Damascius, if A is a
cause of C—whether mediately or immediately—this still implies that it is synonymous
with C. A is consequently not transcendent over C, as it would be for Proclus, since it is
synonymous with C. It is this latter claim that leads Damascius to assert that the first
principle cannot be the One, but another principle beyond the One, ‘the Ineffable’, which
has no causal relation in any way to the One or its effects. Thus, whereas Proclus tries to
hold causality and transcendence together in the One, Damascius splits these two into
separate principles.
Given this outline, Damascius’ position has been interpreted in recent secondary
literature either as concluding a typical lateNeoplatonistmove of positing extra principles,
or as implying Damascius’ acceptance of epistemic skepticism about first principles in
general. The first claimwould imply that the Ineffable is a superfluous principle, since the
One, by itself, should be sufficient to account for the transcendence and causality implied
in being a first principle. Yet neither of these views takes account of Damascius’ causal
framework, both in general and in the case of the One, and further they do not address
how Damascius fits alongside Proclus in addressing the tension of the first approach with
early Neoplatonists.21 In this light the issue of causal synonymy is key to understanding
whyDamascius distinguishes the Ineffable and theOne. As this studywill attempt to show,
while Damascius appropriates Proclus’ framework, he makes certain, radical revisions
in the causal structure of higher principles to account for both issues of causality and
20 Cf. D’Ancona Costa (1996) 375–377.
21 In this vein, cf. Van Riel (2010) 671: ‘Damascius’ commentaries are not so much commentaries on the
classical authors, Plato andAristotle themselves, as they are ‘commentaries on the commentaries’, especially
those of Proclus. Thus, Damascius’ commentaries consist of discussions with earlier positions that were
themselves aimed at integrating older discussions.’ Van Riel’s description here well-applies to the collection
of aporiai in the De Principiis.
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transcendence that Proclus himself attempts to address with mixed results.
Reception in Byzantine, Arabic , and Latin Contexts
As has been mentioned in the literature, Damascius himself does not appear to have
had much explicit reception after the end of pagan Platonism in the sixth century A.D.22
It would appear that even in the last few figures after Damascius in the Academy, no
mention or response is made to Damascius’ metaphysical innovations.23 Although one
might think that this leads to a philosophical dead-end, historically speaking, one can
still find the same tension between causality and transcendence recurring in the receivers
of Proclus’ thought in Byzantine, Arabic, and Latin contexts24—and cases where certain
solutions tend towards Damascius’ Ineffable. We find in these three contexts the question
whether, for instance, the first principle, God, is a ‘cause’ or not; whether God must
be distinguished between an ineffable and a causal aspect; and in what sense God is
transcendent—that is, whether beyond being, or as Being-itself. Here it is worth briefly
reviewing these questions in the three contexts, insofar as this sheds light on our study.
For Byzantines,25 the earliest line of influence for Proclus canbe found in themysterious
author of works like On the Divine Names—commonly known as the Pseudo-Dionysius.26
One finds in the latter both an emphasis on God’s transcendence, which at times implies
language from Damascius’ Ineffable,27 and also a collapse of Proclus’ causal categories of
22 See Van Riel (2010) 672, n. 10: ‘Michael Psellus (eleventh century) mentions Damascius’ name, and calls him
an Aristotelian; he also refers to a Dapsamius, according to whom ‘God is a simplicity that has absorbed
the universe’—which is clearly a mistaken reference to Damascius. Other Byzantine texts may be relying
on Damascius without mentioning him.’ On this, see Van Riel’s introduction in Damascius (2008) clxxxi–
clxxxiii.
23 In this respect, Proclus’ thought and works—especially the Elements of Theology—likely enjoyedmore pop-
ularity and success because of the straightforward metaphysical distinctions that he applies for principles.
By comparison, a work like Damascius De Principiis is not well-suited for a constructive philosophical
project, as one finds in the reception of Proclus.
24 On the reception of Proclus in general, see Adamson and Karfik (2016), and articles in the recently edited
volumes of Layne and Butorac (2017) and Gersh (2014a).
25 On the general reception of Proclus and Neoplatonism in the Byzantine tradition, see Mariev (2017b), as
well as collected articles in Mariev (2017a). See also Trizio (2014).
26 For an overview of the works and theology of Ps.-Dionysius, see Brown (2012) and Perl (2010). On
Ps.-Dionysius and the relation to Proclus and Neoplatonism, among many other publications, see Saf-
frey (1982), Sarah KlitenicWear and J. M. Dillon (2007), Lankila (2014), and more recently, J. Dillon (2017).
27 See for instance Ps.-Dionysius, Epistle II, esp. lines 1–4 (Heil/Ritter ed.), where God is said to transcend the
‘source of divinity and goodness’; cf. Griffith (1997) 241. This hearkens back to Damascius’ claim that the
Ineffable transcends the One, as the Good and source of divinity. For a more substantive treatment and
comparison between Damascius and Ps.-Dionysius, see Lilla (1997), as well Mainoldi (2017), esp. 210–214.
However cf. Adamson and Karfik (2016) 294: ‘As a Christian, Dionysius does not pursue the sort of proposal
we find in Damascius, who separates out the truly ineffable as a further divine principle above the (already
9the ‘unparticipated’ and ‘participated’ which indicate separate entities. Where Proclus
would distinguish between these two sets as separate principles or henads, Ps.-Dionysius
combines these two as simply aspects: in one sense God is ‘unparticipated’, transcend-
ent, and beyond being; in another sense God is directly ‘participated’, immanent, and
Being-itself.28 The later Byzantine figure, Nicholas of Methone (early 1100s–ca. 1160/66),
who commented on Proclus’ Elements of Theology, adopts a Ps.-Dionysian formulation
of ‘unparticipated participated things’ (amethektos metechomena) to speak of God as
both unparticipated and participated in the effects, while he also criticizes Proclus’ hard
distinction between these two attributes.29 By contrast, the earlier Maximus the Con-
fessor (d. 662) appears to return to the hard Proclean distinction between unparticipated
and participated when he distinguishes between God in his eternal, uncreated works
(erga) (alongside temporal, created works) and God in himself, as ‘infinitely infinite times’
(apeirakis apeirôs)30 transcending both eternal and created works.31 This latter formu-
lation contrasts with Proclus’ distinction between the One and the henads, as being of
the same nature and both ‘one’-only, and is rather reminiscent of Damascius’ distinction
between the Ineffable and the One and henads, where there is no ontological or causal
link between the two sides. On this picture, God is causal of all things only through the
uncreated, eternal works—like Proclus’ participated henads. Yet Maximus mentions this
distinction only briefly in passing; in other passages he reverts to a Ps.-Dionysian-like ‘col-
lapse’ of negations and assertions applied to God: for instance, Maximus both denies and
affirms ‘beginning, middle, and end’ of God without making an ontological distinction
between these two aspects.32
It is in the later Patristic figure, Gregory Palamas (1296–1359), that we find an attempt
to systematize the distinction between God’s transcendent and immanent, causal aspects
along the Proclean lines developed in Maximus,33 when Palamas distinguishes between
God’s essence (ousia), as absolutely transcendent, and activities (energeiai), as uncreated
unknowable) One.’
28 One could possibly relate these two ‘respects’ with Proclus’ attempt to understand how the terms, ‘beginning,
middle, end’, are denied of the first principles in the Parmenides’ first hypothesis, while they are affirmed of
‘god’ in Laws IV (715e); Proclus ends up following his master, Syrianus’ interpretation: the negation of the
terms applies to the One in itself, while the affirmation applies to the One in relation to other things. See
Proclus, In Parm. 1114,29 ff.
29 Matula (2011) 882. For a general overview of Nicholas, see Robinson (2017).
30 One finds this formulation in Proclus, ET Prop. 1, 2,10 [Dodds], in the context Proclus’ demonstration that
positing an ontological multitude apeirakis apeirôn is absurd without unity as a constitutive element; and
in Damascius, DP II, 33,2–4, where the second principle, the ‘All-One’, is characterized as apeirakis apeirôn
in a positive way, as the principle of all plurality (see this further discussed below in p. 296, n. 151).
31 Maximus the Confessor, Centuries of Theology I.48–50 (PG 90, 1100C–1101B [Migne]). On the relation of this
passage with Proclus, see my article (2017).
32 Maximus the Confessor, Centuries of Theology I.2, I.8. See earlier n. 28.
33 See Van Rossum (1985) 68–80; Demetracopoulos (2011) 278–280, esp. n. 47.
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and eternal, which represent God as participated.34 This became a point of criticism for
critics like Nicephoras Gregoras, who linked Palamas’ distinction with that of Proclus
between the unparticipated and participated, which for Nicephoras (like Nicholas of
Methone) suggests separate gods and would imperil both God’s simplicity and Christian
monotheism.35 Palamas’ later writings, as well as his followers, attempted to clarify the
distinction in a way that would affirm both the simplicity of God and some form of ‘real’
or virtual distinction without endangering divine simplicity.36 In any case, among all
these Byzantine figures one can recognize the tension at work between affirming God’s
transcendence, as the first principle before all things, and God’s causality, as immanent
and what is first participated by all beings. One finds directions both towards Damas-
cius’ conclusion of a principle beyond the unparticipated/participated, and towards the
opposite conclusion, combining Proclus’ unparticipated/participated distinction.
For the Arabic world,37 Proclus’ framework for the One and its causality came through
a series of texts produced by the circle of al-Kindī, collectively referred to as the ‘Arabic
Proclus’, and a specific text, the Book on the Pure Good,38 which became the well-known
Liber de Causis in its Latin translation.39 Both collections of texts reflect a great simpli-
fying of the metaphysical hierarchy from Proclus, where the Liber, for instance, does
34 See e.g. Gregory Palamas, Triads III.2.6–7. In the latter case, Palamas explicitly references Maximus’ termin-
ology in Centuries of Theology I.48–50. For a thorough survey of the philosophical developments that lead
to Palamas, see Bradshaw (2004).
35 Mariev (2017b) 16–18; cf. Demetracopoulos (2011) 277–278, esp.: ‘As Gregory Acindynos and Nicephoros
Gregoras (1293–1361) noticed in Palamas’ own time, Palamas’ explicit distinction between ‘lower deity’ and
‘God’s transcendental essence’ as well as his plural use of θέοτης is redolent of Proclus’ metaphysical tenet
that each level of the hierarchical structure of beings derives its ontological grade from its essence, whereas
it produces the lower level by granting, in terms of its superior, existence, substance, qualities, and energy to
its inferior.‘As Mariev also notes: ’However, it is important to understand that not only do some of Palamas’
theses point towards what can be characterized as ‘unconscious’ Neoplatonism, (see Von Ivánka 1964)
but, as Demetracopoulos maintains, Palamas also quite consciously adopted some typically Neoplatonic,
and more specifically Proklean, theoretical elements. It is probable that he did so because he thought
that Proklos was a quasi-Christian author, whose authority derives from the indisputable authority of
Ps.-Dionysios the Areopagite.’
36 See Demetracopoulos (2011) and Kappes, Goff and Giltner (2014). Late Byzantines, as especially Gregorios
Scholarios, tended to interpret Palamas in light of recent fourteenth-century translations of ThomasAquinas
and Duns Scotus in Greek. Scotus became an especially more useful interpretive lens, rather than Aquinas,
for reading Palamas. On this see Kappes (2017).
37 Here I use ‘Arabic’ cautiously: philosophers in the tradition, however, encompassed non-Arabic writers, for
instance in Andalusia/Spain as well as Persian writers. See the proviso on the term, ‘Arabic philosophy’ vs.
‘philosophy in the Islamic world’ in Adamson (2016) 298.
38 Full title: ‘Book of Aristotle’s Exposition of the Pure Good’ (Kitāb al-īdāh li-Arisṯūṯālīs fi al-khayr al-mahḏ).
The work was falsely attributed to Aristotle, rather than as an adaptation of Proclus’ Elements of Theology.
See Bardenhewer (1882) and Guagliardo, V. A., et al. (1996).
39 Adamson and Karfik (2016) 295–296. On the general reception history of Proclus in the al-Kindī circle, see
the collected papers of D’Ancona (1995); on the reception of Plotinus in the circle, see also Adamson (2002).
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not raise the distinction between unparticipated and participated—a major point for
Proclus.40 Among other innovations, one significant change from Proclus in the Liber
is that the first cause is described as the ‘first being’ (huwiyya), and not just pure unity
as for Proclus.41 Although one may wonder about the principle’s transcendence since it
is not ‘beyond being’ as for Proclus, the Liber still seems to preserve the same form of
causality for the first principle, just as Proclus’ (and Plotinus’) One, insofar as it transcends
Intellect and all lower beings which are characterized by plurality.42 A second, notable
change is that the principle is described as ‘creative’,43 implying that it brings things into
existence from non-being by will rather than necessity.44 This would implicitly counter
an ‘emanationist’ model of causality implied in Proclus and other Neoplatonists, insofar
as higher causes for them, including the One, necessarily bring about their lower effects.
At the same time, the Liber de Causis, like al-Kindī in his On First Philosophy, endorses
a view of mediated causality for the first principle, so that creation happens through
secondary principles—thus beings are created by the principle through Intellect.45 While
al-Kindī emphasizes the unity of the first principle, denying attributes that only apply
to creatures that are characterized by multiplicity, he still allows that the principle is
properly a ‘cause’.46 On this al-Kindī is similar to Proclus, insofar as both affirm that the
40 For an analysis of the consequences of this position, see Riggs (2017).
41 On the general comparison of the Liber de Causiswith Proclus, see D’Ancona (1992).
42 It is also important to note, ‘being’may have a different connotation betweenProclus (and by proxy Plotinus)
and the Liber de Causis: for Proclus, Being (to prôtôs on) is the first plurality, although simpler than Intellect,
since it is a composite of ‘limit’ and ‘unlimited’ (see ET Prop. 89). The Liber, by comparison (and perhaps
by proxy al-Kindī), seems to equate being with unity, without this question of composition. Along these
lines, al-Kindī appears to make Intellect the first plurality: see Adamson (2016) 302. For a study on the
shift in the use of the term, ‘being’, from the Neoplatonic to the Arabic (and eventually Latin) context, see
D’Ancona (2011); note esp. her insightful conclusion in pp. 44–45: ‘It has been suggested by [Charles] Kahn
in a groundbreaking article that existence in the modern sense becomes a central concept in philosophy
only in the period when Greek ontology is radically revised in the light of a metaphysics of creation: that is
to say, under the influence of Biblical religion. As far as I can see, this development did not take place with
Augustine or with the Greek Church Fathers, who remained under the sway of classical ontology. The new
metaphysics seem to have taken shape in Islamic philosophy, in the form of a radical distinction between
necessary and contingent existence: between the existence of God on the one hand, and that of the created
world on the other. The old Platonic contrast between Being and Becoming, between the eternal and the
perishable (or, in Aristotelian terms, between the necessary and the contingent) now gets reformulated
in such a way that for the contingent being of the created world (which was originally present only as a
’possibility’ in the divine mind) the property of ‘real existence’ emerges as a new attribute or ‘accident’, a
kind of added benefit bestowed by God upon possible beings in the act of creation.’
43 See Liber Prop. 8, from Adamson and Karfik (2016) 296: ‘the First Cause is neither intellect, nor soul, nor
nature, but is above intellect, soul and nature; for it is creative (mubdiʿa) of all things’.
44 Adamson and Karfik (2016) 296. This could also be connected to al-Kindī’s position against the eternity of
the universe, where God then creates the universe by will, rather than necessarily: on this see Adamson
(2016) 302.
45 Adamson and Karfik (2016) 296, and Adamson (2016) 301.
46 Adamson (2016) 302.
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first principle’s transcendence is not at odds with its causality. By contrast a later critic of
al-Kindī—Ibn Ḥazm—attacks the ascription of ‘cause’ (ʿilla) to God, since for Ibn Ḥazm
causation implies a necessary relation to the effect, which goes against the notion of
God’s ineffability as beyond any relation.47 This directly parallels Damascius’ own critique
of making the first principle a ‘cause’, since it implies ‘coordination’ (suntaxis) with the
effect and in this sense cannot be truly prior as a principle (archê).48 Like Damascius
as well, Ibn Ḥazm proposes that God instead ‘establishes’ (waḍaʿa) causes, like the four
elements, which directly bring about their effects. This would also parallel Damascius’
statement that the Ineffable is a ‘sanctuary’ (aduton) from which the One emerges as a
cause which gives rise to its effect of all things (ta panta).49
In the Latin tradition Proclus passed through the ninth-century Latin translations
of Ps.-Dionysius and Maximus by Eriugena,50 and later on the translations of the Liber
de Causis as well asWilliam of Moerbeke’s Latin translation of Proclus’ works from the
Greek.51 Although the same tension is not expressed in terms of causality and transcend-
ence, as between al-Kindī and Ibn Ḥazm, above, an analogous tension arises in the later
Latin tradition between whether to characterize God as pure being, as found in those
like Thomas Aquinas (1225–1274), or as unity beyond being, as found in the later German
Dominican tradition, like Meister Eckhart.52 Thomas is uniquely positioned insofar as he
was the first figure to appropriate the three distinct lines of Proclus’ reception at once,
as mentioned above. In the Liber Aquinas recognizes Proclus’ influence, and goes on to
use Proclus to show how the Liber’s characterization of the principle ‘creating’ through
an intermediary, Intellect, should be contextualized: beings qua beings do not come to
be through Intellect, but only beings endowed with intellect, while beings as such come
to be directly through the principle of Being-itself.53 Whereas for Proclus, and implicitly
the Liber, these represent separate principles, Aquinas follows Ps.-Dionysius (and his
interpretation of Aristotle) by identifying Being-itself, Life-itself, and Intellect-itself with
the first principle, while Aquinas also maintains the Liber’s characterization of the first
47 Adamson (2016) 302–303: ‘Instead, Ibn Ḥazm proposes that we should see God as ’establishing’ (waḍaʿa)
certain causes (such as the four elements) which do necessarily give rise to their effects (20 and 23). Ibn
Ḥazm provides us with a very clear instance of the tension discussed at the beginning of this chapter:
God’s primacy is to be understood as transcendence, and this makes it impossible to call Him a cause.
Unsurprisingly, Ibn Ḥazm quotes in this context the aforementioned Qurʾānic stricture that ‘no thing is
like’ God (20 and 22).’
48 Cf. Adamson (2016) 300, n. 6.
49 Cf. Damascius, DP I, 8,6–11 (discussed below in Ch. 5.3.3, p. 313 ff.).
50 On the reception of Ps.-Dionysius andMaximus, and in general on Eriugena’s work, see Hankey and Gerson
(2010).
51 ForWilliam’s specific translation of Proclus’ Elements (which Thomas Aquinas refers to), see Boese (1985).
52 Although there are passages where Eckhart speaks of being in God, although contextualized by God’s
self-identity. See Adamson and Karfik (2016) 300, n. 51.
53 Adamson and Karfik (2016) 298–299.
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principle as pure being.54 Aquinas thus follows the Liber by maintaining that God’s tran-
scendence is that by which he is a cause, since God’s being is his own, while God also
functions as the paradigmatic cause of being for all created things. The later receivers
of Proclus in the German Dominican tradition, especially seen in Meister Eckhart and
Berthold of Moosburg—aLatin commentator on Proclus’ Elements—come to appropriate
Proclus’ position that unity, rather than being, is the first principle, unlike Aquinas’ and
the Liber’s position.55 For these figures, being comes to represent an attribute strictly
linked with creation, so that God’s transcendence cannot be represented by ‘being’, but
rather, in this way, as beyond being.56 In one sense we find a return to a standard Proclean
position by affirming unity for the first principle, while at the same time the German
Dominicans’ emphasis on God’s unity as discontinuous with being, which is linked with
creation, once again loosely parallels Damascius’ division between the Ineffable, as first
principle, and all things (ta panta) as the effect.
In sum, one thus finds within these three distinct contexts a parallel to the specific
issues raised for themetaphysics of Proclus andDamascius, partly helped by the reception
of Proclus and by internal discussions within each of these traditions. One may then see
the relevance of Damascius and Proclus on the issue of causal relation and transcendence
brought out and repeated within these different contexts.
Status Quaestionis
We should now situate this study among others that have been done on theOne’s causality
in both Proclus and Damascius, especially in light of Damascius’ response to Proclus.
Although outside Plotinus late Neoplatonism has not received as much scholarship for
ancient philosophy studies (at least until recently), much work has already been done
54 Oddly Aquinas fails to mention Proclus’ own position that unity, rather than being, is the first principle, as
noted in Adamson and Karfik (2016) 299.
55 Adamson and Karfik (2016) 299, although cf. earlier n. 52. For an all-encompassing overview of these
positions see Aertsen (1992) and Beierwaltes (1992).
56 Adamson and Karfik (2016) 300: ‘The German tradition connects this apophatic tendency in the Proclus
materials toDionysiannegative theology. This leads to an anti-Thomistic positionwhich restores the original
Proclean (and of course more generally Neoplatonic) claim that God is beyond being. The First Cause
may be identified with One or the Good, as in the Elements, but being is associated with creatures rather
than creator. The parallel claim that the First transcends intellect also fits well into Dionysian theology
since it implies that thought cannot grasp God. Berthold enthusiastically accepts all these consequences,
concluding that man’s relationship with Godmust culminate in mystical union with the divine, rather than
in knowledge of being itself.’ For Berthold of Moosburg however, King (2016) 1–2 notes that he does not
fit into the standard Thomist/anti-Thomist opposition, as might be applied for Dietrich of Freiburg, but
instead Berthold places himself within the more ancient philosophical opposition between Aristotelianism
and Platonism.
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on Proclus in general, especially in recent publications,57 and in particular recent work
has helped to shed light both on Proclus’ causal structure58 and aspects of Proclus’ meta-
physics.59 The situation is less so for Damascius, although recent work has started to
shed light on aspects of Damascius.60 Here I only wish to indicate previous works that
are specifically related to the issues of causality and the first principle in Proclus and
Damascius, and show how this study will contribute to the field.61
For Damascius, the secondary literature can be grouped into roughly three camps:
(1) those that follow a ‘subjective’ or skeptical interpretation; (2) those that focus on
Damascius’ use of aporiai as a method for metaphysics; (3) those that discuss Damascius’
position on the One and the Ineffable in light of the general Neoplatonic hierarchy of
principles.
In the first camp are those like Sara Rappe,62 Dirk Cürsgen,63 Marie-Claire Galperine,64
and Phillipe Hoffmann.65 For Rappe, Damascius’ discussion of the Ineffable is meant to
show the inadequacy of discursive human thinking, and an abandonment of a proposi-
tional way of doing metaphysics, as one finds in Proclus’ framework, for example.66 Thus
she finds that Damascius uses skeptical language and argumentative strategies, like the
mode of relativity from Sextus Empiricus, for instance, to attack the ‘relational character
of causation in general’.67 In this she thinks that Damascius attacks Proclus’ Proposition
57 See for instance the collected papers of d’Hoine and Martijn (2016), Layne and Butorac (2017), and Gersh
(2014a).
58 See for instance Martijn and Gerson (2016), which I have only just seen before the time of this disserta-
tion’s submission. See also Van Riel (2016), whose general presentation I generally follow, although with
reservations, specifically in his comparison with Damascius: see below Ch. 5.3.4, p. 316 ff.
59 Among recent studies, see for instance Vargas (2016) for a thorough study on time in Proclus. On Proclus’
use and transformation of Aristotle’s physics for sensible and intelligible entities, see the excellent and
thorough study by Opsomer (2009). On the principle of nature in Proclus, see Martijn (2010); and on
sensible substance and Proclus’ shift from Plotinus, see Russi (2009).
60 In this regard the best overviews of Damascius can be found in Combès (1996b), Combès (1996c), C. G. Steel
(1978) (esp. 77–119, in the context of the soul for Damascius), and more recently Van Riel (2010).
61 For a more detailed analysis of the secondary literature, see Tanaseanu-Döbler (2016) 367–371, as well as
the Introduction to Metry-Tresson (2012) (esp. 15–23).
62 Abhel-Rappe (2010) and Ahbel-Rappe (1998).
63 See Cürsgen (2007).
64 Damascius (1987), 26–35.
65 See Hoffmann (1997).
66 E.g. Ahbel-Rappe (1998) 362: ‘Despite his Sceptical affiliations, Damascius ends his Doubts and Solutions
with a theological testimony to the truth of his unorthodoxy, his metaphysics of the Ineffable (C-W, [DP] III.
161). […] Damascius writes for those who belong to the tradition but whose intellectual activity impedes
their progress. For such people, the only way to remove doubt is to remove human thought altogether.’ The
thesis about the inadequacy of discursive thought is brought out more in her chapter on Damascius in
Rappe (2000) 197–230. Cf. p. 146, n. 25.
67 Ahbel-Rappe (1998) 358; cf. Rappe (2000) 207–208.
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11 from the Elements of Theology in the beginning aporia of De Principiis I, 1–2,68 as part of
his venture to remove the ‘barriers’ of discursive thought.
Hoffmann looks at Damascius’ discussion of the Ineffable in contrast to Plotinus on
the One’s ineffability, and considers it primarily in light of the soul’s knowledge of first
principles. For Hoffmann, Damascius’ framework implies the impossibility for doing
negative theology.69 He considers passages where the soul is analogous to someone who
is blind trying to perceive color by touch.70 As a result, the ‘ineffable’, rather than being a
name by which the One is ‘hymned’ and honored as in Proclus, instead indicates a limit
in Damascius beyond which the soul cannot pass in the attempt to appropriate the first
principle itself.71 In this sense Hoffmann’s reading considers the Ineffable mainly as an
epistemological, negative limit, and not within the broader picture of principles.
Cürsgen gives a more direct, skeptical interpretation of Damascius’ position, which
he sees as anticipating Kant, insofar as Damascius emphasizes the gap between human
knowledge and the principles in themselves—implied in Damascius’ distinction between
the One and the Ineffable.72 Cürsgen thus emphasizes passages (like Hoffmann and
Rappe) where Damascius appears to say that we impose concepts on principles like the
One and the Ineffable, which do not imply the content or entities behind those concepts.
Galperine also appears to follow this line of thought in her conclusion on the Ineffable in
Damascius, which she refers to as more ‘mystical’ than a metaphysical principle.73
68 Ahbel-Rappe (1998) 356. Although Damascius ends up using the same argument from Prop. 11 in multiple
places—e.g. in his proof for the One’s superiority to the Unified (‘Being’ for Proclus) in DP I, 54–55, and
when Damascius claims that the One is the first, ‘proper’ cause (DP I, 5,11–12). The issue for Damascius, as
we will see, is the relation of the cause to the absolute first principle.
69 Hoffmann (1997) 385.
70 Hoffmann (1997) 381: ‘Ce silence s’installe dans l’impossibilité de la théologie négative. Il est la «limite du
discours» (πέρας τοῦ λόγου) qui coïncide avec son «renversement» (περιτροπή).’
71 Hoffmann (1997) 388–390.
72 Cürsgen (2007) 321–322: ‘Das menschliche Denken muß aus und mit seiner immanenten Verfassung
einen doppeltenWeg in die Leere des Nichts gehen, wo es scheitert und endet, aber auch seine reflexive
Selbstverortung vollziehen kann; es schreitet aus der Mitte seiner ursprünglichen, innerlichen Strukturen
zu den Rändern voran, an denen jene sich auflösen und von sich selbst als inadäquat begriffen werden.
Dennoch ist der Denktrieb im Menschen unauslöschlich und folgt aus der menschlichen Natur, ihrem
ursprünglichen Zwischenstatus, aus dem das ihm gemäße Denken den Menschen ständig hinaustreibt.
Die Erkenntnis der Unmöglichkeit der Erkenntnis des Absoluten mit konkreten Erkenntnisformen und
-prinzipien bildet damit das wesensgemäße, sich notwendig stufenweise entwickelnde Ende des Denkens,
die Selbstbegrenzung und Selbstvollendung des Denkens an einem nicht einmal mehr negativ aussagbaren
Absoluten. Will man einen historischen Vergleich bemühen, so nimmt Damaskios einen philosophischen
Standpunkt ein, der gleichermaßen Kantische und Fichtesche Gedanken vorwegnimmt.’
73 Damascius (1987) 31: ‘Si l’invitation à «demeurer en repos, dans le sanctuaire indicible de l’âme» semble
plus mystique que métaphysique, il n’y a pas de théologie ici. Et le principe indicible n’est pas dieu. La
question de l’absolu n’est pas celle des rapports de dieu et du monde. Ce jeu serré de métaphysique pure se
joue, dans les premières pages du Traité des premiers principes, sur le plan des idées pures, entre le tout, le
quelque chose et le rien.’
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In the second camp (2) are Carolle Metry-Tresson74 and Damian Caluori.75 In gen-
eral these authors tend to focus on Damascius’ use of aporiai in revealing the different
principles, from the Ineffable to the One and the principle, the Unified. Metry-Tresson’s
2012 study in particular is focused on Damascius’ use of aporetic arguments as revealing,
through the experience of the arguments and their structure, the principles in question.
In this sense, Metry-Tresson’s reading is similar to the subjective readings above inasmuch
as she still thinks that the arguments reveal the inner structure of human thought,76
although she de-emphasizes the skeptical interpretation, as above.77 Caluori also makes
a similar argument in his study on the first aporia in De Princ. I, 1–2, where he shows that
Damascius is not offering an Aristotelian-style aporia—which leads to a middle-ground
positive answer—nor a strictly skeptical-style aporia, like those given by Sextus—which
would throw in doubt the whole metaphysical structure; rather Damascius, for Caluori,
gives a unique kind of aporetic argument that reveals the nature of the Ineffable, without
implicating it or questioning its existence.78
For the purposes of our study, these readings—especially those following a skeptical
interpretation—do not appear to take into account two factors. One is passages where
Damascius indicates a stronger relation between principles in their transcendent aspect
and their causal aspect, so that the difference does not amount to a complete separation
between the two, but rather, as it were, a ‘modal’ distinction. Cosmin Andron, and
especially Sebastian Gertz’s recent paper,79 have already brought out this aspect, which
partly helps refute a hard skeptical reading. A second, more general factor is the thesis
74 Metry-Tresson (2012) and Tresson and Metry (2005).
75 See Damian Caluori (2018).
76 Metry-Tresson (2012) 25: ‘La thèse du Péri Archôn, au fond, n’est pas de dénoncer la transcendance du
principe qui rend impensable l’immanence du principe aux réalités, mais d’exhumer la difficulté qui vient
de la loi même de la pensée. Quelle est donc cette loi de notre pensée qui nous empêche de saisir dans la
pleine lumière de l’intelligence les principes premiers? La question que Damaskios ne cesse de reprendre
à chaque aporie est celle de l’interrogation fondamentale portant sur les conditions de possibilités de la
pensée humaine.’
77 Similar to Metry-Tresson’s reading is D. O’Meara (2004) 204–206, who focuses on the effect of Damascius’
aporia on the soul, where the arguments keep referring back to the self.
78 Although in hisÜberweg entry on Damascius (in Damain Caluori (Forthcoming)), Caluori reads Damascius’
theory of knowledge along the lines of the first camp (1), which may implicitly include his reading of
the Ineffable. For instance: ‘Wie [Andron (2004)] in einer detaillierten Analyse gezeigt hat, besteht der
Unterschied darin, dass das (traditionelle) Erkenntnisobjekt nichts anderes als das Ding ist, das erkannt
wird, während der Erkenntnisgegenstand das Erkenntnisobjekt ist, insofern es erkannt wird. Dieser Unter-
scheidung liegt ein tieferliegender, an Kant erinnernder Pessimismus zugrunde, gemäß dem wir nie etwas
als es selbst erkennen können. Was wir eigentlich erkennen, ist immer nur ein Erkenntnisgegenstand,
d. h. ein Erkenntnisobjekt, wie es sich uns darstellt.’ This, however, seems to misinterpret Andron, who
argues for a ‘perspectivalism’ reading—in other words, we get a grasp of the thing in itself as an ‘aspect’ of
the object, rather than the whole object (or in the context of the De Principiiswhich Andron argues from,
Intellect grasps a ‘side’ of Being via its ‘gnôsma’). Discussed below in Ch. 3.2, p. 157, n. 59.
79 See Gertz (2016).
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that this study poses: namely that Damascius is responding to a tension found within
the dialectic between Neoplatonists on the One’s status as both causal and transcendent,
especially in Proclus; Damascius’ use of aporia and his construal of the Ineffable is not
meant, then, to cast a negative, ‘pessimistic’80 light on the inquiry into metaphysical first
principles, but rather to offer a ‘positive’ response to the tension posed with affirming
the One’s causality and transcendence at once.81 In this respect, the skeptical reading
may draw out a consequence of Damascius’ position, but it does not adequately describe
Damascius’ intentions in light of the previous tradition.
In this respect the third camp (3) gives us a more promising approach for our study.82
Among this group, the overview given by Jan Opsomer (2013) is a touchstone for this study,
insofar as it compares Proclus on the One and Damascius on the One and the Ineffable,
and provides an outline for the reasons why Damascius shifts away from Proclus.83 What
this study hopes to add on to Opsomer’s analysis is the underlying causal framework in
Damascius, which leads to the ‘split’ between the Ineffable and theOne, andwhich has not
received much analysis. Gerd Van Riel’s study on the Limit and Unlimited in Damascius
(2002) is one step in this direction. Van Riel shows how Damascius highlights certain
problems implied in Proclus’ account of the Limit and Unlimited from the Philebus, such
as the opposition implied between the Limit and Unlimited, while Damascius attempts
to solve the tension by asserting the principles’ unity in a prior principle—the Unified.
As we will see, this becomes one focus of our study in Chapter 5, especially as it relates to
a tension that arises in Proclus’ framework.84 Similarly Carlos Steel (1999) highlights the
implicit tension in Proclus’ interpretation of the final deduction in the Parmenides’ first
hypothesis, where Proclus affirms both the absolute ineffability of the first principle and
the One as the subject of the first hypothesis—an implicitly speakable entity.
Given this, Van Riel (as well as Jan Opsomer)85 also raises a significant objection to
Damascius’ Ineffable, which we might term the ‘superfluous principle’ objection: if the
One forDamascius is also transcendent and implies no plurality in itself, just as for Proclus,
why posit the Ineffable in the first place? In fact, if one posits the Ineffable, what would
stop someone from positing an extra principle behind the Ineffable, and then another ad
80 As in Cürsgen’s ‘Kantian’ reading, as well as Damain Caluori (Forthcoming) (see previous n. 78) and Rappe’s
reading.
81 This is not to deny that one can find a negative response in Damascius’ construal, as in Cürsgen (2007) and
others. But as I hope to show, this is not Damascius’ direct concern: there is no ‘return’ to skepticism for
Damascius, except insofar as it proves useful to refining Proclus’ system.
82 Although the scope of her study is not directly related, worth honorable mention is Tanaseanu-Döbler
(2016), who focuses on the school ‘heresy’ of Damascius’ response against Proclus. She brings up a number
of helpful points against the skeptical thesis, e.g. p. 370, n. 40; p. 372, n. 44.
83 Along these same lines are Combès (1996b) and Combès (1996c).
84 As I show at the conclusion of Chapter 4, starting from Sect. 4.5.5, p. 244 ff.
85 Opsomer (2013) 638. We consider these objections below in Ch. 5.3.4, p. 316 ff.
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infinitum?86 This difficulty appears to be raised if one assumes that Damascius’ One is
functionally equivalent to Proclus’ One, while only the linguistic reference to the One
is what detracts from the One’s transcendence.87 Yet as this study will show, this is a
significant mis-reading of the One for both figures:88 for Damascius, it is exactly because
the One is causally, and not just linguistically, synonymous with ‘all things’, that it is no
longer transcendent in the way that Proclus’ One is. In this sense, the current work will
help to contribute to seeing why and how Damascius argues this for the One.
For Proclus, much has been done to expose both his understanding of the One’s caus-
ality and the notion of unparticipated and participated causality.89 Here we may note
specific authors who have addressed these two areas in light of the background and ten-
sions implied in Plotinus. Cristina D’Ancona’s work has been especially significant in this
regard: she has shown how Proclus responds to the issues raised in Plotinus’ construal of
the One, as both transcending plurality and as the cause of plurality and unity.90 In this I
followD’Ancona’s analysis of Proclus, where the One as unparticipated is Proclus’ attempt
to solve the difficulty implied in Plotinus’ One. D’Ancona also raises a difficulty that we
will discuss further: namely, Proclus appears to posit two causal models—the henads,
and the Limit and Unlimited—below the One, which both facilitate the One’s causality
for the lower levels. At first it is not apparent whether or how the two are coordinated
systematically, and the ambiguity is one that Proclus does not directly answer. Where
he does address the issue in certain passages, Proclus seems to imply that the henads
are determined, if not composed, by the Limit/Unlimited. But if the henads are entirely
simple and one-only, this means that they should not be composed by the Limit and
Unlimited. On this issue D’Ancona, Van Riel, and Edward Butler, among others, have
proposed differing solutions, which we consider more in depth in Ch. 4.5 (p. 226 ff.), and
this study proposes an alternative that has not been considered in the literature.91
The issue of the coordination between the henads and the Limit/Unlimited becomes
86 As raised in Van Riel (2016) 76–77.
87 This comes out in Van Riel (1997) 37–38, albeit in Van Riel’s analysis of the ‘ineffable principle’ in Iamblichus:
see below p. 79, n. 230.
88 See for example Van Riel (2010) 676: ‘According to Proclus, the One is the cause that contains everything,
while at the same time transcending all things. Damascius argues that this cannot be an adequate account
of the nature of the first principle.’ Van Riel presumes that Damascius and Proclus hold the same view of
the One in its causality. However, the first sentence is a fundamental misreading of Proclus: Van Riel cites
Proclus’ In Parm. 1108,19–29 and PT II.5, 37,24–5. However in the Platonic Theology passage (latter), Proclus
says that all things proceed from the One, while in the former passage, Proclus says that the One is a cause
of all things by not being any one of them. Just before Van Riel’s citation, Proclus says that ‘we will preserve
it as One in the proper sense and remove all things from it’ (1108,7–8)—in other words the One should not
contain all things. By contrast, Damascius would argue for this—that the One contains, or is, ‘all things’.
For this reason, our study in Ch. 5, p. 247 ff., becomes important.
89 See for instance Chlup (2012) 99–110; Martijn and Gerson (2016); d’Hoine (2016a) 108–110.
90 D’Ancona Costa (1996), esp. 375–380.
91 See Ch. 4.5.4, p. 243 ff.
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a significant conflict in Proclus’ model, which is important to account for the One’s
causality, since the One mediates its final effect of plurality and unity through these
intermediate causes. Thus Proclus’ model for the One’s causality depends on how he
construes these intermediate causes. This specific focus, especially bearing in mind
the tension in Plotinus’ model, is one that has not been well addressed in the literature
(beyond those like D’Ancona), which this study seeks to address and elaborate. Further,
Damascius’ account of the One becomes an important factor that addresses this conflict
in Proclus’ model: whereas Proclus prohibits all relation between all things and the One,
including the characters (idiotêta) by which the henads are differentiated, Damascius’
understanding of the One allows for such a relation, since the One is causally synonymous
with ‘all things’. By proxy, the One then implies the plurality of characters that correspond
to the henads. This is an additional area which has not been addressed in the literature
that this study will pursue.
Chapter Structure of this Study
We should now summarize the main points of this study and how we will proceed. The
first chapter analyzes Proclus’ predecessors on the One, with an eye towards the tension
implied in Plotinus’ model to which Proclus is responding. The first section (1.1) surveys
Plotinus’ predecessors on the first principle, from the Old Academy response to Plato and
Aristotle to the Middle Platonist, Numenius, who anticipates Plotinus; within this survey
one finds cases where the principle is identified either as a divine intellect (Alcinous, for
instance) or distinguished between a higher and lower ‘one’ or intellect, yet all make the
first principle either a being or a kind of intellect. In Sect. 1.2, we look at Plotinus’ response
to the tension implied in these earlier models: namely that, if it is an intellect or a being
of some kind, the first principle implies the plurality of the Forms that it either contains
or produces. This leads to Plotinus’ radical shift in asserting the One’s status as ‘beyond
being’ in a strict sense, and thus not an intellect. Yet as we will see, Plotinus’ construal
of the One implies a dual-sided aspect: in itself it contains no plurality, yet since the
One directly produces plurality, and since it acts as a paradigm of Intellect and Being, it
internally implies attributes that are correlated with plurality and pertain to Intellect and
Being. In Sections 1.3–1.5 we look at the reception of Plotinus in Porphyry and Iamblichus,
as well as Proclus’ interpretation of these three figures. One finds the consequences of
Plotinus’ position made explicit in both successors, even for Iamblichus who anticipates
Proclus and later Neoplatonists who add intermediate principles between the One and
Intellect. We end with Proclus’ master, Syrianus, in Section 1.6, where he establishes
the foundation for Proclus’ understanding of the One, and the causal framework that
supports responding to the tensions implied in a Plotinian conception of the One.
The remaining chapters are then split into two groups: the first set (Chapters 2–3)
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focus on the general causal frameworks for Proclus and Damascius, which informs how
they construe the One’s causality; and the second set (Chapters 4–5) focus specifically on
the One’s causality and the important correlation of participated principles, for Proclus,
and the Ineffable grounding the One, for Damascius.
In the second chapter, we consider the distinction between unparticipated and par-
ticipated entities as crucial for Proclus’ response to the tensions implied in Plotinus’
causal model. Proclus builds this distinction on his understanding that productive causes
produce intermediate entities that convey the producer’s effect while they also mirror
the participant’s nature. This distinction applies both between each individual soul and
its participating body, and more generally between the first, unparticipated cause of a
property to individual, distinct participants. This balances both the transcendence of
the cause—insofar as it is unaffected in itself by the participant(s)—while causal syn-
onymy is still maintained—insofar as the intermediaries themselves reflect the character
of their prior causes. The emergence of distinct levels of beings then results, not from
being contained simultaneously in the same way within the One, but one-by-one from
unparticipated causes which are self-constituted in their particular character, ultimately
going up to Being which constitutes itself below the One.
The third chapter shows how Damascius’ causal framework is built as a response to
difficulties raised in cases of dissimilar causation, like the derivation of Intellect from
Being, which breaks the principle of causal synonymy. This leads Damascius to hold
that causal synonymy cannot apply only between the cause and the intermediate cause,
or power, as in Proclus, but it must include the final effect: in other words, to produce
Intellect the principle of Being must ultimately be like, or synonymous with its effect,
Intellect. Damascius thus introduces a fundamental modification for causation: that in
producing an effect, causes ‘act on themselves’ in the causal process. Thus two stages are
posited for producers: in themselves they transcend their effects—thus they are not causal
in this sense—but in the causal process, the producer in itself becomes synonymous
to the effect as a cause. This leads to a major revision of Proclus’ distinction between
unparticipated/participated causes, as well as the notion of self-constitution: while
Damascius keeps these causal distinctions, they indicate a progressive separation of unity
and being, from higher, ‘concentrated’ causes to lower, ‘unfolded’ effects.
The fourth chapter begins by focusing on Proclus’ proof for the One, where compared
to Plotinus’ proof, Proclus distinguishes between two notions of prior unity: one that
implies plurality ‘by participation’ (kata methexin), and one that is beyond the direct
participated relation with plurality, both of which correspond to the participated and
unparticipated distinctions. Thus, Proclus’ understanding of henads, as the prior unities
that are plural ‘by participation’, is a major factor to account for the One’s causality.
Alongside the henads, Proclus also poses the Limit and Unlimited as intermediaries
between the One and beings, so they also fulfill the same intermediary role that the
henads perform. A number of questions emerge about the relation between the two, but
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a fundamental issue at stake is this: what accounts for the henads’ distinction? Even
if the Limit and Unlimited are responsible for this, then one needs to account for the
distinction between the two in the first place. One would be tempted to locate these in
the One, yet Proclus explicitly denies this, let alone any relation between the One and the
principles below it. This tension then suggests an opposite problem to the one possessed
by Plotinus and his successors: the One may be transcendent and produce unity, but it
is not clear how it accounts for the distinction between the Limit and Unlimited, and
thereby the plurality of unique characters that distinguish each henad.
Finally in the fifth chapter, we consider Damascius’ aporia on the first principle’s
relation to all things in the beginning of the De Principiis. Damascius’ notion of the
One as in a ‘coordination’ (suntaxis) with all things—even if it is not strictly identified
with ‘all things’ as its cause—follows on his notion of causal synonymy, as indicated in
Chapter 3: thus if the One truly causes ‘all things’, as a cause it must be synonymous
with ‘all things’, or as Damascius says, it is ‘all things itself ’ (auto panta). Since the notion
of a ‘principle’ (archê) implies priority to the effects, whereas the notion of a ‘cause’
implies being the same in kind as the effects—and therefore with the effects—this leads
Damascius to assert that the proper ‘principle’ cannot be the One but rather a truly non-
causal principle: the Ineffable. Damascius then treats the Ineffable not as a skeptical
conclusion, but instead as a grounding principle by which the One functions as the first
cause. This leads to two results: first, the Limit andUnlimited, whichwere separate henads
for Proclus, become co-related principles implied within the One; and second, Damascius
makes a third principle—the Unified—the first henad which is has the combination
of unity and plurality as its characteristic property, unlike Proclus’ henads which are
only ‘one’ by their character. These two consequences suggest that Damascius’ account
solves the causal ‘gap’ between the One and the henads in Proclus, both by affirming the
existence of unity and plurality within the henads, and by affirming the One’s internal
relation to the principle of plurality, which results in the derivation of the Unified and
the henads. This move, however, is made possible only by separating the principle of
absolute transcendence, which Damascius does with the Ineffable.
On the whole, this work attempts to place Proclus and Damascius within the whole
Neoplatonic (and by proxy, overarching Platonic) tradition by asking, in a nutshell: what
justifies Proclus positing the One as unparticipated? And what justifies Damascius in
positing the Ineffable, if not Proclus’ One? The answer for both, we find, is an attempt to
solve the tension of transcendence and causal relation for the first principle. Both Proclus
and Damascius begin with roughly the same structure, yet they diverge in the manner in
which one can or cannot ascribe causality to the first principle as a result of the causal
framework they employ.
Conclusion
In our study we have sought to place Proclus and Damascius within a general tension that
runs throughout the Neoplatonic tradition: in affirming the existence of a principle that
is the first cause of all things, one needs to affirm the principle’s transcendence over the
effects it produces—yet as a cause, the principle must also be like the effects it produces.
At face value these two aspects seem to conflict with each other: if one emphasizes the
principle’s transcendence, this risks detaching its causal relation from the effects, while
if the principle’s causal relation is emphasized, this implies that the principle is itself
characterized by the feature it is supposed to transcend as the first cause. In all the figures
we have looked at, especially from Plotinus onward, each attempts to address this tension
in the way that the principle is formulated.
As our study has shown, what then makes Proclus and Damascius unique among other
Neoplatonists is that they attempt to address this tension by making the first principle
prior in every respect to the pluralitywhich is produced after it—both theOne, for Proclus,
and the Ineffable, for Damascius. For both, the principle transcends both plurality and
any direct causal relation with the effects that come after it, while intermediate principles,
like the henads, are responsible for the production of plurality. This is a contrast to the
earlier tradition,1 particularly found in Plotinus and Porphyry, which attempts to make
the principle, in the case of the One, both transcendent and a direct cause of plurality.
This results in the notion of the One as being simple in itself, but as also pre-containing
the character of the plurality which is produced after it. For Proclus, and even Damascius,
one cannot accept this notion: if the principle truly transcends its effects, it cannot be
causally related, at least directly.
Where we find Proclus and Damascius parting ways is in how each describes the
One, as the first cause, in relation to its final effect of plurality. For Proclus, the One’s
causality does not entail that it is directly related to its final effect—although it produces
entities, like the henads, that produce that plurality. This allows for the One to be both
transcendent and act as a cause, since its causality does not implicate it in the process
of the production of plurality. By comparison the One’s causality for Damascius rather
implies its final effect of plurality, or all things, even while he accepts Proclus’ premise
1 The ‘first reading’ from our Introduction: p. 6.
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that the first product after the One also exists in unity. The result for Damascius is that the
One cannot remain transcendent in the causal process, but becomes correlated with the
lower level of the effects that come after it. Thus, Damascius posits a separate principle,
the Ineffable, which remains transcendent and is not causally related to any of the effects
that come after it, in order to ground the One’s causality.
So far our study has attempted to work out why and how Damascius makes this latter
move, and in turn how Proclus first responds to the tensions of the earlier tradition by
construing the One in the way he does. This has involved three steps in our study: first,
we have indicated the predecessors’ views about the first principle, either as a divine
intellect or as the One (Chapter 1), which finally motivates Proclus’ position; second, we
have analyzed Proclus’ and Damascius’ causal frameworks (Chapters 2–3), which ground
the way that each construes the first principle—either as the One for Proclus, or the One
and the Ineffable for Damascius; and third, we have looked at Proclus’ and Damascius’
positions on the One in itself, and whether or not this leads to a separate principle, as the
Ineffable for Damascius (Chapters 4–5).
Thus in Chapter 1, we made our investigation in two halves: in the first half we set up
the motivations for Plotinus to posit the One as the first principle amidst the backdrop of
the Old Academy and Middle Platonists; and in the second half we investigated Plotinus
and his successors on the One. One of the outcomes we saw in the first half is that
a number of positions anticipate features we find in later Neoplatonists: for instance,
the distinction between two ‘Ones’ in Eudorus which correlates with Proclus’ One and
the Limit, and in Numenius the distinction between the two intellects that anticipates
Plotinus’ distinction between the One and Intellect. Yet as we found, the problem with
construing the first principle as an intellect—as Numenius had done, as well as the
majority of earlier Middle Platonists—is that plurality is implied: as the first cause of
plurality, the principle in itself should not be such a plurality. One can then see why
Plotinus comes to assert that the principle must simply be ‘one’ in itself in relation to its
effect of plurality.
As we concluded, one problem with Plotinus’ construal is that he makes the One
paradigmatic of the plurality that it produces: as such, it must anticipate features that are
characterized by plurality, as seen in passages like Ennead VI.8.13–21. Even when Plotinus
tries to mediate the tension by qualifying his language, he is bound up by the problem of
causal synonymy for the One: framed another way, if the One explains perfections found
in Being and Intellect, it must embody them to a higher degree in itself. This suggests
that the One is the same in kind as the plurality it produces.
It is perhaps this difficulty with language for the One, in comparison with Being and
Intellect, that leads Porphyry to find a systematic method of predication for both the
One and Intellect/Being. As we have seen, Porphyry attempts to articulate the differ-
ence between the One and Being as analogous to the relation of an indefinite genus, in
itself, to the species, where the species are the same in kind as the genus but exist as
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defined relative to the undefined genus. Insofar as the One is indefinite like the genus,
it might escape being implicated by the plurality that comes about at the defined level
of Being. Yet as we saw in Iamblichus, the distinction fails to affirm the transcendence
of the One, where the One cannot be the same in kind, as Porphyry’s solution suggests.
Iamblichus’ response, as we saw was to separate out different principles—and this led to
a distinction between a transcendent, non-causal principle, and the One as the first cause.
Like Plotinus, Iamblichus preserves a two-sided view of the One: as ‘one’ in relation to
all things, but within itself precontaining paradigmatic features that belong to Being.
Iamblichus’ higher, ineffable principle thus grounds the One’s activity—a feature we find
revived inDamascius’ framework. But as we saw for Syrianus, in the conclusion of Chapter
1, Iamblichus’ position on the One is unsatisfactory: the One’s unity should suffice to
explain both its causality and transcendence as a principle. Syrianus thus sets the found-
ation for Proclus’ framework by making Iamblichus’ ineffable principle the One-alone, as
unparticipated, and by re-appropriating Iamblichus’ ‘One’ into a plurality of henads, as
participated ‘ones’. The important difference between Iamblichus and Syrianus—as we
also find in Proclus—is that the One, as unparticipated and transcendent, is affirmed as
a cause, since it produces the plurality of henads, and by transitivity produces plurality
through the henads. Syrianus’ innovation, then, compared to Plotinus, Porphyry, and
Iamblichus is to affirm that the first products after theOne are also just ‘one’ in themselves,
rather than pluralities.
Chapters 2 and 4 thus spelled out Proclus’ systematization and elaboration of hismaster,
Syrianus’, initial framework. In Chapter 2, the main question we addressed was how
Proclus comes to justify the distinction between unparticipated and participated causes.
As we have seen this presupposes a distinction between primary and instrumental causes
in all cases of productivity: in the case of particular causes, like individual souls, the soul, as
existing separately (choristôs), cannot produce its effect in the participating body without
implanting an immanent power in its participant. Proclus thus relies on a principle of
intermediate causality, where the primary cause produces an intermediary that directly
brings about the effect in the participant. This allows for causes like the soul to bring
about its effect immanently within the participant without being reciprocally affected.
Proclus thus generalizes this framework with the distinction between unparticipated and
participated causes, where the unparticipated functions as the first cause of a common
property found in multiple participants. Participants then receive that common effect
directly from their respective, participated causes—like a given living body with its
particular soul—and not directly from the unparticipated. In this way, the unparticipated
brings about its effect across multiple participants without being, in turn, reciprocally
conditioned by the plurality of the participants.
This framework becomes crucial for Proclus to articulate the One as both transcend-
ent and a cause, as we find developed in Chapter 4: as unparticipated, the One is not
reciprocally affected by the plurality of the participants of unity, but it still has a causal
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relation, insofar as it produces the henads, which in turn produce the effect of unity in all
beings. However, as we find in the latter half of the chapter, there is an implicit conflict in
Proclus’ model: Proclus appears to employ two intermediate participated causes, with the
henads and the Limit and Unlimited. While the henads are responsible for the character
of unity produced in each, distinct participant, the Limit and Unlimited are responsible
for the common composition of unity and power, or plurality, found in all participants
of Being. In Proclus’ texts it is not immediately clear how the two are coordinated, if at
all, or in what sense one may be subordinated to the other. As we investigated certain
contemporary positions on this issue, one conclusion wemade was that Proclus indicates
the Limit and Unlimited as the first henads to emerge from the One, while the deriv-
ation of the other henads after the Limit/Unlimited is determined by these latter two
principles. Yet, as we ended the chapter, an open tension in Proclus’ framework is how
he accounts for the Limit and Unlimited’s derivation from the One: Proclus has been
careful to emphasize that what comes after the One is also merely ‘one’—yet then how
do the Limit and Unlimited come forth from the One as distinct from each other? What
individuates their particular characters as Limit and Unlimited, even if they are still ‘one’
by their nature? This results in an aporia for Proclus’ framework: on the one hand, he
perhaps successfully construes the One as both transcendent and a cause—at least of
unity—but in what sense the distinction comes to be between the most basic entities
after the One remains unaccounted for.
Thus while Proclus claims the transcendence and causality of the One and all unparti-
cipated causes, when we turn to Damascius we find these two aspects pulled apart in our
investigations in Chapters 3 and 5. In Chapter 3, we saw that Damascius appropriates
Proclus’ framework for the unparticipated and participated, but raises basic questions
about the causality of entities that differ in kind from their causes: in particular, how
Being produces Intellect, even though Being in itself is not the same in kind as its effect,
and therefore is not causally synonymous with Intellect. Throughout Damascius’ aporia
on this point, he eventually concludes that causes, in producing their effect, become char-
acterized by what they produce: as he phrases it, causes ‘act on themselves and on their
effect’. Thuswhile Being, by its ownnature, has no causal relation to Intellect, Beingmakes
itself mirror the effect that it produces, and thus it becomes synonymous with the effect
it generates—even though it remains distinct as a cause. As we have seen, this reflects
Damascius’ emphasis that causes exist as such only in relative opposition to their effects,
whereas in themselves, before they produce anything, there is no causal relation. Thus this
reflects a two-sided distinction in causes, either before or during the causal process, where
it is only at the latter stage that there is a causal relation. This reflects a dynamic structure
of reality for Damascius, where higher causes exist as ‘concentrated’ in relation to the
effects, which are an ‘unfolding’ of the higher cause. This results in a re-adjustment for the
higher levels of reality, specifically between Intellect and the One: at the level of Being, or
the Unified, the distinction between the unparticipated and participated does not exist,
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since distinction as such only fully exists beginning at the level of Intellect, where subject
and object of thought become fully distinct. At higher levels, the distinction becomes
such that one cannot distinguish between unity and being, as one can in Proclus between
the henads as participated and intelligibles as the participants. Thus, whereas Proclus
sees reality as derived episodically from higher levels—for instance, the henads exist by
themselves, as ‘one’-only, before Being and the intelligibles emerge—Damascius appears
to see reality ‘unfolded’ and ‘concentrated’ altogether—thus the henads exist as both ‘one’
and ‘being’ together, as undifferentiated, while at lower levels unity and being become
progressively separated as distinct elements.
Damascius’ two-sided distinction between causes before and during the causal process
becomes a central premise in his distinction between the Ineffable and the One, as is
argued in Chapter 5. There, we showed how Damascius’ aporia in the beginning of
the De Principiis (I, 1–2) sets out a dichotomy between the notion of ‘cause’, implying an
immediate, opposed relation to its effect, and the notion of ‘principle, which implies being
prior, and without relation to, the effect. From our previous chapter, this should show that
Damascius’ conclusion for the Ineffable is not the result of a ‘skepticism’ in Damascius’
view of first principles, but rather the consequence of a dynamic ‘unfolding’ of effects
from higher causes, where the causes per se become contextualized and transformed
in producing lower effects. Thus we first showed that one of Damascius’ main claims is
that the One is causally synonymous with its final effect, all things (ta panta). In Proclus,
while the One produces henads, which in turn produce plurality, this means that the One
is a cause of ‘all things’—but not causally synonymous with ‘all things’. By contrast, for
Damascius, if the One is such a cause, this also entails synonymy with ‘all things’. For
Damascius this means that the One must then anticipate its final effect within itself
in the causal process. This results in Damascius reorienting Proclus’ two principles of
the Limit and Unlimited as principles internally implied within the One: thus when
the One produces ‘all things’, it becomes distinguished into three principles—the One-
All (corresponding to the Limit), the All-One (corresponding to the Unlimited), and
the Unified—with the Unified representing the first henad which pre-contains both ‘all
things’ and unity together within itself.
As a consequence of the One internally changing itself as a cause, this implies that the
One no longer remains transcendent in the causal process—just in the same way that
Being no longer remains transcendent when it causes Intellect. This leads to Damascius’
argument for the Ineffable as a principle which remains transcendent while the One, as
the first cause, produces its subsequent principles. As we concluded, Damascius is not
arguing for a subjective distinction between the Ineffable and the One, nor is he repeating
the same function or role of transcendence that the One otherwise has—but instead he
attempts to maintain the Ineffable’s function as a principle which grounds the One, but
without explicitly ascribing causality to it.
One general outcome we can draw from our study is that Damascius’ model solves the
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causal ‘gap’ between Proclus’ One and the Limit and Unlimited, since the One anticipates
the two principles in itself, even though Damascius agrees with Proclus and denies that
the One pre-contains, in itself, plurality. On the other hand, Damascius appears to shift
the tension from the One to the Ineffable: if the Ineffable in fact ‘does’ something—for
instance, act as a principle of transcendence for the One’s ‘relative’ transcendence—does
this not yet implicate it? While Damascius exercises great caution to secure its position, as
we have shown, one cannot help but feel that the tension is not quite removed. Damascius’
solution may follow as a logical response to the difficulty in Proclus’ framework, insofar
as he attempts to give the One more causal ‘weight’, however at the expense of being
fully transcendent. Yet one may still wonder if Proclus’ difficulty could be solved some
other way, in spite of the tension, than by concluding to an ineffable principle that is
both the beginning and the end of a metaphysical study of first principles—or to speak
more exactly, as a condition for beginning with the One as the first cause in such a study
of principles.
One other interesting outcome that we have only touched on in Damascius is that
he tends to construe unity as relative to plurality. As we saw in his critique of Proclus,2
Damascius thinks that Proclus’ solution of the One as the first principle does not work,
since the One—as prior to the opposition between unity and plurality—ultimately be-
comes reduced to the ‘unity’ that is juxtaposed with plurality. Although he still affirms
the causal priority of the One, Damascius appears to return to an Aristotelian position
that unity is correlated with being, rather than prior to being, as Aristotle argues against
the Old Academy Platonists. If he actually makes this move, this would be a major shift
from nearly all previous Neoplatonists, inasmuch as the One always comes before being,
whereas Damascius comes to affirm the co-existence of unity with being. This reflects one
area that scholarship has yet to investigate, particularly the use of Aristotle in Damascius’
logic and ontology.
Connected with this, although the Academy in Athens closed under Damascius, and
Platonism slowly crumbled as a school association, it is telling that later receivers of
Proclus and other Neoplatonists, like the author of the Liber de Causis, tend to collapse
the One into Being for the first principle. Although it is unclear that Damascius had
much influence after the Academy, one cannot help but wonder if Damascius’ arguments
for the One’s co-relativity with ‘all things’ and Being precipitates this move by the later
traditions—although there is no known, clear textual connection. We may at least thank
Damascius for revealing an aspect of the One’s causality, or at least an aspect that solves
a difficulty in Proclus’ account, even though Damascius’ final solution raises questions of
its own. Although Damascius is more known for the obscure, radical position of positing
the Ineffable as the first principle, Damascius’ innovation, as this study has shown, may
lie more with his notion of dynamic causality for the One, and for all lower levels.
2 Cf. Ch. 5.2.3, p. 292 ff.
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